Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court: History, Problems, and Proposals by Reynolds, William L. & Young, Gordon G.
HeinOnline -- 62 N.C. L. Rev 29 1983-1984
EQUAL DIVISIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT: 
HISTORY, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS 
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDSt 
GORDON G. YOUNG* 
Since first co'!fronting the problem of the e.ffect of an equal divi-
sion, the Supreme Court has imposed a flat rule of a.ffirmance of the 
lower court's decision. Although this rule has the advantage of extreme 
ease of application, it ignores the strong policies implicated in certain 
classes of cases. At times, institutional and jurisprudential considera-
tions militate strongly in favor of a rule of reversal Professors Reyn-
olds and Young explore the history and just!fication of the rule of 
a.ffirmance, and propose an alternative approach more sensitive to the 
policies involved in the case under review. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The theory that a system oflaws provides, at any time, one right answer--
one uniquely correct way of disposing of a case-occasionally has been en-
dorsed by judges and scholars. At one time endorsement often resulted from 
heartfelt belief.1 More recently, some advocates seem to find the truth of that 
notion established by its usefulness.2 For those who would themselves believe 
or at least convince others of the existence of one right answer, one fact proves 
especially inconvenient: judges disagree; judges dissent. Disagreement proves 
especially troublesome in constitutional law because dispositive rules are often 
open textured and a judicial decision can thwart the workings of other 
branches of government, particularly Congress. In this context, it is obvious 
that the Court makes law and that the effect of doing so is of great importance. 
These facts raise questions of the legitimacy of judicial conduct, but do not 
decide them. By now those not happy with judicial lawmaking are at least 
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1. SeeK. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 24 (1960) for a 
description and rejection of the "one right answer'' view. 
2. Ronald Dworkin has argued that our legal system should assume that there is one right 
answer to most questions concerning the existence of rights. He asserts this even for cases in 
which reasonable judges would reach different results after applying identical legal materials -
rules, principles and policies-to identical facts. See R DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
279-90 (1977). Llewellyn surely would take issue with this position. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra 
note 1, at 24-25 & n.l7. 
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reconciled to a great deal of it. The problem of legitimacy is most acute, how-
ever, when the disagreement is dead even. In that case there can be no ques-
tion of presuming that the majority is correct or, for those less illusioned, no 
possibility of following majority rule, designed like a coin flip, to provide some 
answer. It is ironic that the Supreme Court, established to provide the right, or 
at least the best possible, answer to justiciable federal questions, faced the 
problem of equal division in the first constitutional case it decided.3 The 
Court's answer to the problem was to reach for another largely mechanical 
rule having some surface logic and roots in English legal practice-the rule 
that the decision appealed from should be affirmed. That rule has been unre-
mittingly applied by the Court ever since. 
Because of the way appellate systems have been viewed historically,4 the 
Court seems to have viewed the rule of affirmance as inevitable. Inevitable it 
is not. Although it may be a good rule in many cases, the rule needs thought-
ful reexamination. Moreover, it is a bad rule in at least two identifiable cases: 
those in which a successful attack on federal legislation or a criminal convic-
tion would be sustained by an even vote. Beyond these categories of cases, we 
urge generally that the Court be aware that affirmance on equal division is not 
inevitable and consider, as cases arise, whether an institutional rule of reversal 
would be more appropriate than the usual rule of affirmance. Before discuss-
ing these matters, however, we first survey the history of current practices and 
some possible methods for avoiding equal divisions altogether. 
II. THE EQUAL DIVISION: SHOULD THERE BE CONCERN? 
The legal profession's neglect of equal divisions is surprising given their 
history and frequency.5 Equal divisions have hardly been rare in the history 
of the Court, and they occur with some frequency today. Between 1925 and 
1982, we have located 123 equal divisions, an average of two per year.6 Is the 
3. Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). 
4. As a result of an implicit presumption favoring the decision appealed from, that decision 
stands unless the appeals court takes affirmative action, ie., finds it erroneous. The appeals court 
is regarded as incapable of taking such action unless a majority of a quorum agree that the deci-
sion below was in error. For a full discussion of such a view, see ir!fra notes 73-74 and accompa-
nying text. 
5. Scholars have paid virtually no attention to the problem. But see W. REYNOLDS, JuDI-
CIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 32-34 (1980). The recent affirmance of the conviction of former 
Governor Mandel of Maryland sparked some law review co=entary on equal divisions. The 
affirmance took the form of an evenly divided en bane court of appeals decision which vacated a 
panel decision that had overturned a conviction. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 
1979), vacated on reh'g by an equally divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.) (en bane) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). See also Note, United States v. Mandel: The Mail Fraud and En 
Bane Procedural Issues, 40 Mo. L. REv. 550, 580-88 (1981). 
6. This number was derived by searching the LEXIS data bank, which only includes cases 
decided since January I, 1925. Cases in which only part of the decision involved an equal division 
are included. Multiple cases decided by the Court with a single order were counted as a single 
equal division. The number of equal divisions per decade has fluctuated somewhat: 
1925-1932: 2 equal divisions 
1933-1942: 24 equal divisions 
1943-1952: 31 equal divisions 
1953-I 962: 28 equal divisions 
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lack of attention due to the absence of cause for concern? 
The effect of deadlock can be overstated. Although all cases before the 
Supreme Court, by definition, are important, surely some are more important 
than others. It would have been desirable, for example, if the Supreme Court 
had definitively resolved whether the Federal Trade Commission could assert 
jurisdiction over the American Medical Association, but the recent affirmance 
on equal division of the case raising that question will not shake the founda-
tions of the Republic.7 Moreover, delay in authoritative resolution will gener-
ally not be a serious problem. A deadlock caused by a missing Justice can be 
solved by the appointment of a new one, and a deadlock created by a recusal is 
not likely to affect a series of cases because the recusal usually is caused by the 
Justice's relation to the parties rather than to the issues, and, therefore, can be 
cured in a later case. 
In some circumstances, however, problems created by an equal division 
can be serious. The Supreme Court, the apex of our federal judicial system, 
can profoundly affect the activities of both the states and the coordinate 
branches of government. 8 The Court is responsible both for guiding and con-
trolling the growth of constitutional law, and for performing its function as the 
ultimate interpreter, and sometimes maker, of laws in the federal system. 
When it affirms by an equal division, it has failed to resolve authoritatively a 
problem of at least some national importance.9 Thus, there is often more at 
stake than the harm caused by the failure to clarify the law for future cases. In 
I 963-1972: 20 equal divisions 
1973-1982: 18 equal divisions 
Unlike their cousins, the plurality opinions, equal divisions do not seem to be on the increase; 
since the inception of the New Deal the average has been 2.3 per year, a pattern followed with fair 
consistency. There were six equal divisions in the 1980 and 1981 Terms: American Medical Ass'n 
v. Fed. Trade Co='n, 102 S. Ct. 2004 (1982); Co=on Cause v. Schmitt, 102 S. Ct 1266 (1982); 
Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981); Staats v. Bristol Laboratories Div., 451 U.S. 400 
(1981); Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981); Walter Fleisher Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 
449 u.s. 608 (1981). 
7. American Medical Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Co='n, 102 S. Ct. 2004 (1982). 
8. See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System Structures and Inter-
nal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 209 (1975). 
9. Certainly cases in which any court strikes down a federal law as unconstitutional or in 
which a state court upholds a state law despite a constitutional challenge are important cases. The 
intuitive obviousness of that proposition is confirmed by Congress' decision to include such cases 
in the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction, 28 U.S. C. §§ 1252, 1257(1)-(2) (1976). Even in 
nonconstitutional cases much may be at stake and resolution at the highest level may be clearly 
desirable. The outcry over the inability of the United States to appeal the quashing of indictments 
in the Beef Trust Case (United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1906)), illustrates how 
great that concern may be. See Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United 
States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 39 HARV. L. REV. 325, 336-41 (1926). 
The national importance of certiorari cases is shown by the rule of four, which requires at 
least four Justices to conclude that the Court, overburdened as it is, should hear the case. Al-
though Congress has provided a deadlock avoiding mechanism only for direct appeals from the 
district court, 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1976), discussed infra note 53, Congress has indicated that it 
recognizes the importance of resolving other cases at the highest level, for the Court must hold 
those cases over if a majority of Justices believe resolution is possible during the next term. Id 
On August 10, 1982, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill that would make all of 
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction discretionary. H.R. 6872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 
CoNG. REc. H72 (1982). The Senate approved a similar bill during the previous Congress. S. 
450, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 7648 {1979). 
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cases of sufficient importance, authoritative resolution of the case by the na-
tion's highest tribunal is essential. 10 Several situations illustrate the potential 
harm of an equal division. 
First, in those rare cases in which an equal division occurs because of the 
long and indeterminate absence of a Justice, 11 a whole series of cases challeng-
ing a regulatory program could be affected. Second, the result in one case can 
have dramatic impact, for example, when the case is a class action on behalf of 
a broadly defined nationwide class of plaintiffs who succeed in enjoining an 
important governmental program.12 Indeed, in such cases, the res judicata 
effect may be as potent as the stare decisis effect of a unanimous Supreme 
Court decision. In such a case, affirmed by an equally divided Supreme 
Court, it matters little that the decision has no binding effect in other circuits. 
Third, even in cases posing none of these problems, equal divisions can pro-
long a geographical inconsistency that may cause major problems in the ad-
ministration of a federal program. Inconsistency in application of the tax 
laws, for example, could seriously undermine public confidence in that largely 
self-administered program. Moreover, affirmance by equal division in crimi-
nal cases may erode confidence in the basic fairness of our system of justice. 
Finally, inconsistent results in related cases may also erode confidence in the 
judicial process.13 
Avoiding equal divisions is particularly important in cases involving con-
stitutional issues. For compelling reasons, these issues should be resolved at 
the highest level. First, they are often issues whose resolution has great impact 
on the functioning of federal, state, and local governments, as well as on per-
sonal rights. More important, perhaps, is the immediate effect of questionable 
lower court decisions affirmed by an equally divided court. Willard Hurst de-
scribed how much havoc can be wreaked by unreviewed lower court decisions: 
the middle 1930s showed how federal policy and administration 
could be brought to a standstill by a flood of injunctions in lower 
federal courts pending review by the Supreme Court. Timing is 
often of the essence in law and in politics; the practical power of 
lower federal courts to suspend the operation of a policy for months 
pending Supreme Court review can be of great impact. 14 
10. A Justice sometimes will note expressly that he is joining the majority only in order to 
avoid consigning the problem to "the limbo of unexplained adjudications,'' Inman v. Baltimore & 
Ohio R.R., 361 U.S. 138, 141 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
11. An example is Justice Jackson's service as Special Prosecuter at the Nuremburg War 
Crimes Trial. See in.fra note 34. 
12. See, e.g., Co=on Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980) (three-judge court), 
qffd by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982), discussed in.fra text accompanying note 97. 
13. A dramatic example is provided by two recent cases involving presidential immllnity. In 
Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981), qffg 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the Supreme 
Court's split decision let stand a lower court's ruling that a President could be held civilly liable 
for certain actions. The following year, the Court, in a different case, held the President absolutely 
immune from civil liability. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982). 
14. Hurst, Review and the Distribution of National Powers_ in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME 
LAW 140, 141-42 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (emphasis added). "In 1935, 36 federal judges issued some 
sixteen hundred injunctions preventing federal officials from carrying out federal laws." A. 
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 824 (1960). 
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If, on review in such cases, the Supreme Court equally divides, the "suspen-
sion" of federal law and policy can be permanent (in practical effect). Com-
mon Cause v. Schmitt 15 shows that even today federal legislation can be 
suspended although half of the sitting Justices believe that action unwar-
ranted. Finally, there is the suspicion, impossible to allay or confirm, that an 
equal division was reached because it was a convenient way to decide a troub-
lesome case. This suspicion does little to encourage faith in the judiciary. 
Thus, the case for preventing equal divisions is strong. Prevention, however, 
should occur only if the medicine prescribed to avoid deadlock is less harmful 
than the disease itself. 
III. HISTORY 
The problem of equal division is as old as the Supreme Court. Indeed, 
Rayburn's Case, 16 apparently the first constitutional decision by that tribunal, 
involved an even split among the six Justices.'7 Although Rayburn's Case 
affirmed the decision below, 18 it was not until a generation later that the 
Court, in The Antelope, expressly articulated the rule, followed to this day, that 
an equal division requires affirmance of the decision under review. 19 That 
holding comes to us laconically enough; Justice Marshall simply noted that 
one of the issues was a question on which much difficulty had been felt. 
It is unnecessary to state the reasons in support of the affirmative or 
negative answer to it, because the court is divided on it, and conse-
quently, no principle is settled. So much of the decree of the circuit 
court [as deals with this issue] is affirmed.2o 
Within a year, Marshall had repeated the holding: "No attempt will be made 
to analyze [certain cases] ... because the judges are divided .... Conse-
15. 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980) (three-judge court), qffd by an equally divided court, 455 
u.s. 129 (1982). 
16. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
17. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 825 
(1981). The existence of an equal split can be gleaned only from newspaper accounts. I d. at 824. 
18. Because they believed the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, three Jus-
tices voted to refuse a writ of mandamus to the lower court. Those Justices prevailed on equal 
division. The reasoning of the three Justices who favored issuing the writ is not known. I d. at 
822-25. 
19. 23 U.S. (lO Wheat.) 66 (1825). Although tradition has The Antelope, as "apparently the 
first occasion of an equal division," Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972), Professor Currie's 
research has shown that not to be so. See Currie, supra note 17, at 824-25. 
20. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 126-27. This was not Marshall's first brush with the problem of 
equal divisions. Four years earlier he had written an opinion in a case in which the Supreme 
Court was asked to issue a writ of error to compel a new trial in a criminal case; the circuit court 
being divided on that motion. An equal division in the circuit courts (which were two-judge 
courts) was one ground for appeal to the Supreme Court under the Judiciary Act of 1801. The 
Court held, however, that such a division of the circuit court was "not one of those divisions of 
opinion which is to be certified to this court .... " United States v. Daniel, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
542, 549 (1821). 
Justice Marshall was probably aware as well of an earlier decision by Judge Cranch in the 
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. Henry v. Ricketts, 11 F. Cas. 1188 (C.C.D.C. 1809) 
(No. 6385). The court in that case divided evenly on a question of evidence. The issue was 
whether defendant's objection to certain evidence had been waived as plaintiff asserted in a mo-
tion. Because of the deadlock, the court held that the motion (waiver) must fail. 
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quently, the principles of law which have been argued cannot be settled; but 
the judgment is affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it."21 
Thus, it was settled early in Supreme Court jurisprudence that affirmance 
on equal division was to be the rule. It took somewhat longer for the Court to 
make clear the stare decisis effect of an equal division. Writing for the Court 
in an 1868 case, JJurant v. Essex Company,22 Justice Field stated that although 
the decision of an equally divided Court is "conclusive and binding in every 
respect upon the parties," the prevailing rule of practice "prevents the decision 
from becoming an authority for other cases of like character."23 Field's justifi-
cation for the proposition that equal divisions are to have no precedential 
value was murky.24 He cited no clear American precedent, instead finding 
that proposition implicit in the Court's established attitude toward equal divi-
sions and in his view that under both the American and the English practice 
an equal division can result in no "affirmative action," but rather leaves mat-
ters as they stood. zs 
Field was undoubtedly aware of at least one English case, and some 
American commentary, that dealt explicitly with the stare decisis effect of an 
equal division.26 The English case indicated that an equal division was to 
21. Etting v. Bank of the United States, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 59, 78 (1826). In view of the 
later practice of not writing opinions in cases of equal division, it is interesting that Marshall 
prefaced his holding with a discussion and co=entary on the facts developed at trial. /d. at 73-
78. 
22. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107 (1868). 
23. /d. at 113. The case had been heard previously by the Supreme Court, which had af· 
firmed the dismissal below. The plaintiff filed again. 
24. /d. at ll0-13. Field's language is not altogether clear: 
The statement which always accompanies a judgment in such case, that it is rendered b;• a 
divided court, is only intended to show that there was a division among the judges upon 
the questions of law or fact involved, not that there was any disagreement as to the 
judgment to be entered upon such division. It serves to explain the absence of an;• opinion 
in the cause, and prevents the decision ftom becoming an authority for other cases of like 
character. But the judgment is as conclusive and binding in every respect upon the 
parties as if rendered upon the concurrence of all the judges upon every question in-
volved in the case. 
/d. at 113 (emphasis added). Apparently, the statement that the Court is divided explains the 
absence of opinion and prevents the decision from being an authority. This view assumes that 
courts already follow the rule (whatever its origins) that an equal division is not precedent. Thus, 
Field simply is stating that it is important not just to affirm when a court divides evenly, but to 
make clear that the Court was divided so that future courts can follow the no precedent rule. 
Note that Field did not explain the source of the no precedent rule; he assumes its existence. 
Field may have inferred the rule from English practice (id. at ll0-13), from his view of good 
sense, from the practice of not writing opinions, or from any combination of the foregoing. 
25. /d. at 110; see infta text accompanying notes 73-75. 
26. During oral argument in .Durant, Justice Grier stopped the appellees from arguing the 
effect of an affirmance by an equally divided court. He referred them to a note of an unreported 
decision in Pennsylvania, which he said was "clear and satisfactory." /d. at 109 (Reporter's Note). 
That review, included in 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 753, as an appendix to the report, contains the 
earliest known examination of the rule of affirmance and takes a surprising view of the stare 
decisis problem. I d. at 755. The reviewer, Horace Binney Wallace, correctly cited an English case 
as holding that an affirmance by equal division is to stand as precedent. /d. at 754, citing 
Catherwood v. Caston, '153 Eng. Rep. 108 (Ex. 1844). Catherwood, in tum, relied on an earlier 
equal division in the House of Lords as precedent. 153 Eng. Rep. at 109-10, citing Regina v. 
Millis, 8 Eng. Rep. 844 (H.L. 1844). Millis was, indeed, an equal division. /d. at 982. 
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stand as precedent,27 and the commentary apparently accepted this view as the 
American rule.28 Without citing either case or commentary, Field took a con-
trary view and in his opinion for the Court completed the American law on 
equal divisions. In 1972, when the Supreme Court wrote its most recent exe-
gesis on equal divisions,29 the tenets were the same as in Field's time: an 
equal division (1) affirms the lower court; (2) binds the parties by means of res 
judicata and allied doctrines; and (3) is not regarded as precedent.30 In its 
nearly 200 years, the Supreme Court has never decided a case inconsistently 
with any of these propositions. Moreover, since the time it clearly articulated 
these propositions, the Court has endorsed them in the broadest terms, 31 never 
suggesting the possibility of exception. 
In addition to observing these apparently hard and fast rules, the Justices 
have adhered strongly, if not universally, to the practice of not publishing 
opinions dealing with substantive issues on which they have divided equally.32 
Occasionally an individual Justice or two, or more rarely all of the participat-
ing Justices, have deviated from this practice.33 Far more common is a simple 
statement of the tie and affirmance, a statement which does not present even a 
line-up of the Justices on the issues. 
IV. MEANS FOR AVOIDING EQUAL DIVISION 
There are at least two ways to avoid the problem of equal divisions. The 
first would eliminate the numerical deadlock among the Justices, either by 
granting a rehearing or by ensuring that a panel with an even number of Jus-
tices never sits. A second method would designate a tie-breaking Justice. This 
section considers those options. 
A. Postponement or Reconsideration of Decision 
1. Postponement 
An equal division can occur only when an even number of Justices sit, an 
occurrence requiring the absence of at least one Justice. This can occur either 
27. Catherwood v. Caslon, 153 Eng. Rep. 108, 109-10 (Ex. 1844), citing as precedent, Regina 
v. Millis, 8 Eng. Rep. at 844, 982 (H. L. 1844); see supra note 26. 
28 . .Durant, 14 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 753 (Reporter's Note). 
29. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972). Neil expressly confirms the rule of affirm-
ance and the rule of no precedential value. For a modem statement that the practice in equal 
divisions is to write no opinion, see Ohio ex rei Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264 (1960). 
30. Compare the language of the cases cited in supra note 26 with Field's statements in .Du-
rant, 14 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, ll0-13 (1868). The equal division closely resembles in effect the 
unpublished opinion issued by many appellate courts. See generally Reynolds & Richman, An 
Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of RefOrm, 48 
U. CHI. L. REv. 573 (1981). 
31. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972). 
32. See, e.g., Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264 (1960); Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
107, l13 {1868). 
33. See, e.g., Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264 (1960); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 
540, 561 (1840). See i'!fra notes lll-21 and accompanying text. 
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through recusal of an individual Justice or because of a death or resignation.34 
The most obvious method for ensuring the participation of an odd 
number of Justices in a case is to postpone argument until events eliminate the 
likelihood of deadlock.35 In some cases the costs of delaying justice will be 
low-when the participation of an even number results from the brief illness 
of a Justice, or from a vacancy soon to be filled, for example. In other sorts of 
cases, particularly those resulting from most recusals, the length of the delay 
involved in the strategem would render it very costly. The costs involved in 
delaying justice, therefore, depend upon both the type of case involved and the 
probable length oftime necessary to secure a tie-breaking Justice. Thus, cases 
in which justice or policy demands speedy resolution would not be prime can-
didates for postponement when the equal division stems from a recusal not 
likely soon to cure itself.36 Although it is probable that the Court on occasion 
has postponed a formal decision because it appeared equal division was likely, 
it is impossible to determine how frequently that has occurred.37 
2. Rehearing 
Alternatively, after an equal division, the Court might grant a petition for 
rehearing in order to substitute· a decision on the merits.JB Occasionally, the 
34. Far more equal divisions in the period 1925-1982 were caused by recusal or temporary 
absence (75%) of one or more of the Justices than were caused by a vacancy on the Court (25%). 
No Justice in that period contributed to an abnormally large number of deadlocks through 
recusal. The Justices with the most such recusals were Douglas (12), Jackson (12), Clark (I 1), and 
Stewart (11). Jackson had the highest number of recusals per year served (0.9), a statistic ex-
plained by his prior service as the Solicitor General, his absence to serve as Special Prosecutor at 
the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, and his lengthy illness shortly before his death. 
35. The famous Charles River Bridge Case (Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 
(11 Pet.) 420 (1837)) provides a dramatic example: 
The bridge arguments concluded on March 11 [1831); five days later, the Court an-
nounced that it was unable to agree on a judgment and ordered the case continued. John 
Marshall and his colleagues never reached a final decision, however, and the case 
lingered in a kind of limbo until a largely reconstituted court heard new arguments six 
years later. 
S. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 57 
(1971) (emphasis added). See also id. at 54-56. The decision in Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. 
(11 Wall.) 39 (1870), was apparently held up for the same reason. See Justice Field's statement in 
Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 112, concerning the postponed decision in Virginia v. 
West Virginia. 
Similar to the practice of postponement on equal division was the apparent practice of the 
Court in 1972, when there were two vacancies, of not passing on a certiorari petition if three 
members of the Court thought it should have been granted. Because of the delay, it was possible, 
when the vacancies were filled, to decide whether to hear cases of potential national importance in 
accordance with the Rule of Four. 
36. An Attorney General turned Justice, for example might recuse himself for a long period 
of time from certain types of litigation. Another example is Justice Stewart's recusal from cases on 
review from the Supreme Court of Ohio, e.g., Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), because his 
father served on that court. 
37. See supra note 35. Daniel Webster suggested in correspondence that the Court, on at 
least one occasion, postponed a decision while awaiting the return of Justice Todd, the tie-breaker, 
from his circuit-riding duties. Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason, February 23, 1819, 
in 16 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 51-52 (Little, Brown & Co. 1903). See 
also 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) vii (Reporter's Note, 1820). 
38. SeeR. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 791-92 (5th ed. 1981). 
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Court has resolved an equal division by granting a rehearing when circum-
stances, such as the appointment of a new Justice, augured well for breaking 
the deadlock.39 Since 1925 that has occurred in at least a dozen cases.40 Re-
hearings in this context apparently have always been granted during the Term 
of the original equally divided decision.41 If the Court continues to adhere to 
such a ''Term rule" or even to a two-Term rule ofthumb,42 a large number of 
equal divisions will not be amenable to a rehearing solution. Indeed, when the 
Term rule is applied, only equal divisions occurring as a result of a Justice's 
brief absence or just before a new appointment are likely to be cured by 
rehearing. 
In order to address more generally the equal division problem by means 
of rehearing, the Court would have to extend the time within which a rehear-
ing will be granted. In cases not involving equal divisions, the Court has dis-
pensed with a hard and fast "same Term" rule, occasionally granting 
rehearings in the Term following that of the original decision,43 and once de-
laying for three years.44 The practice of delayed rehearing has been trench-
antly criticized45 because expectations can be upset if the possibility of a late 
rehearing is not known, or its use not kept within precise bounds. Even if a 
clear but long limit were known to be possible, speedy justice would suffer. In 
the typical equal division, permitting the lower court to have the last word is 
the lesser evil when compared with the long period of uncertainty that might 
follow an equal division if the deadlock, for example, results from the recusal 
of a Justice based on a prior relationship with the parties to the litigation.46 
There may be some cases, however, in which a long delay can be justified. 
The Supreme Court both dispenses justice to individual parties and functions 
as constitutional oracle of last resort. It must weigh the interests of speedy 
justice against the costs of allowing the decision of a lower court to have dis-
positive and dramatic national impact. Particularly in the case of significant 
litigation such as the hypothesized case seeking an injunction against the fed-
eral government when injunctive relief has been granted, but stayed pending 
appeal, delay may be appropriate.47 If the lower court decision favoring the 
class is affirmed, that tribunal effectively has made law for the whole country, 
law that may cripple a federal regulatory program. Surely in such a case, and 
39. Id 
40. See, e.g., Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 313 U.S. 596, granting rehg to 313 U.S. 538, 
rev'd, 314 U.S. 118 (1941). 
41. Id But see i'!fra note 43 for cases granting later rehearing in other contexts. 
42. See i'!fra note 43 and accompanying text. 
43. Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, 382 U.S. 25 (1965) (approximately three 
years); United States v. Ohio Power, 353 U.S. 98 (1957) (approximately 18 months). See generally 
R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 38, at 781-89. 
44. Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, 382 U.S. 25 (1965). 
45. See Cox, Foreword· Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 91, 132-35 (1966). 
46. An example would be the recusal of a former Attorney General from litigation in which 
he had participated. 
47. Indeed, this mild remedy follows a fortiori from our proposal that the decision below in 
these cases should be reversed. 
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perhaps in others, lengthy delay is justified unless personal rights would be 
substantially abridged.48 Because of the importance of the issue, however, 
postponement would be preferable to an initial affirmance followed by a re-
hearing. Although the latter is simply a disguised instance of the former, the 
uncertain nature of the rehearing method may cause confusion and misplaced 
reliance in the interim. 
B. .Designation 
Another method of avoiding equal divisions is the designation of a judge 
from another court to hear the case and break the deadlock. This device, 
which a number of state courts use,49 could be employed either before argu-
ment if it were apparent that only an even number of Justices would sit, or 
upon rehearing following the equal division.5° Federal statutory law at pres-
ent, however, permits only the temporary assignment of a district judge to the 
court of appeals, and expressly forbids the assignment of a judge of an inferior 
court to the Supreme Court.51 This prohibition no doubt reflects the grave 
prudential and constitutional questions that would attend such an assignment. 
Although the answer is by no means clear, such an assignment might violate 
provisions of article III, including the requirement that there be "one Supreme 
Court."52 
Were it constitutional to provide for designation, the benefits in most 
48. Postponement of ultimate vindication always causes some injury in fact. Nevertheless, 
some postponement is compatible with balanced justice. Criminal defendants, for example, are 
ordinarily required to present their federal constitutional defenses to the highest state courts that 
can hear the matter before seeking federal relief. Thus, a criminal defendant must often suffer 
through a criminal trial that would prove unnecessary were the Supreme Court's views known in 
advance. See Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 162-64 (1943). When, however, recog-
nized rights would be lost if the postponement were required, the Court has made exceptions to 
established procedures. See Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971) (per curiam); see also 
Note, The Finality Rule for Supreme Court Review of Stale Court Orders, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 
1010-12, 1027-32 (1978). The problem, of course, lies in determining when harm is sufficiently 
grave and avoidable at reasonable cost to warrant recognizing a right to avoid the harm in particu-
lar context, e.g. , a right to an immediate appeal With respect to deciding whether and for how 
long to postpone in an attempt to avoid deadlock, the Court similarly must attempt to balance 
inchoate interests. 
49. See, e.g., Mo. CoNST., art. IV, § 18(b) (by constitution); MINN. CoNST., art. 6, § 2 (by 
constitution); MoNT. CONST., art. VII,§ 3(2) {by constitution); HAWAII REV. STAT.§ 602-ll (1976) 
{by statute); N.J. PRACTICE 2:13-2A {Supp. 1983) {by statute). 
The designation of a tie-breaker has ancient roots. In Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
107, Ill (1869), Justice Field observed that an English statute, dating from the reign of Edward 
Ill, provided that if the King's Bench or Co=on Pleas were divided evenly, "the case is to be 
adjourned to the Exchequer Chamber, and there be argued before all the justices of England." If 
they divide e~~ally it was "to be determined at the next Parliament by a prelate, two earls and two 
barons .... 
50. In Maryland, for example, judges are specially assigned to the court of appeals on a 
routine (but not universal) basis when a member of the court does not sit. There have been cases 
in which the court of appeals has split 4-3 following reargument; the initial argument having been 
held before six judges, with an apparent tie-breaker added for reargument. E.g., Winterwerp v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 277 Md. 714, 357 A.2d 350 (1976). 
51. 28 u.s.c. § 294(d) (1976). 
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § l. Proposals for a National Court of Appeals were opposed not 
only on the basis of prudence, but also on the ground that the court would violate the Constitu-
tion's co=and that "[t]he judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme 
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cases would be low and the costs high. The authority of a decision in which a 
tie is broken by a designation would probably be weak,53 particularly in con-
stitutional law, an area in which the Court has been more than willing to over-
rule its own precedents. 54 Designation might well undermine the respect 
accorded even unpopular Supreme Court decisions.55 It would be a circum-
vention of the political checks a Justice must pass in the nominating and ap-
proval process, checks designed to ensure that it is ultimately the majority will, 
however filtered, which determines the composition of our highest counter-
majoritarian institution. 56 Using a designated judge would be tantamount to 
Court .... " See Gressman, 17ze Constitution v. The Freund Report, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 951, 
960-64 (1973). ' 
The "one Supreme Court" objection directly applies to the proposed National Court of Ap-
peals. The Freund Report suggested creation of a court of last resort to serve in a variety of 
unportant cases; opponents countered with the argument that it would be a second Supreme Court 
forbidden by the Constitution. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER STUDY GROUP, REPORT ON THE 
CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT {1972). 
The argument against designation is less direct. It would contend that there is but one 
supreme court, The Supreme Court. When a judge is appointed, it is clear that he will serve on 
what the Constitution refers to as the Supreme Court. In addition, what the Constitution refers to 
as the Supreme Court is identified as a specific institution. The Constitution refers to other federal 
courts generically as inferior federal courts and presumably gives Congress much leeway as to 
their existence and composition. Consequently, temporarily or even permanently moving a judge 
from one lower federal court to another should be within congressional power-at least if, at the 
time of the judge's appointment, that prospect is reflected in the law governing the structure of the 
lower federal courts. Moving a judge to the Supreme Court, the argument continues, requires an 
appointment to that Court. Support for that argument is provided by the need felt, at least in some 
states, to provide specifically for that designation in the Constitution. 
The above arguments are not clearly dispositive, however. Although the Constitution says 
there shall be one Supreme Court, it does not make clear that an inferior federal court judge also 
cannot be appointed a Supreme Court Justice to serve when designated. If judges of the lower 
federal courts were routinely named to serve as Supreme Court Justices by designation, the ap-
pointment and advice and consent problem discussed in the text would evaporate. The decision to 
appoint or to give consent could be made in light of potential Supreme Court duties. The only 
serious constitutional question would be whether an institution staffed by some permanent and 
other part-time, but lifetime, Justices could be what the Constitution means by "Supreme Court." 
53. This is not necessarily the case, however. In 1948 Congress provided a procedure for 
dealing with the failure of a quorum on appeal from a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1976). 
When that happens, the three most senior judges of the court of appeals of the circuit from which 
the case came hear it by certification from the Supreme Court and render an opinion, which is 
final. Section 2109 has been used only once, in the famous Alcoa monopolization case, United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945). Alcoa has long been treated as if it were 
a precedent of the Supreme Court, perhaps due to the forceful nature of Learned Hand's opinion. 
54. The traditional rule has been that the Supreme Court is more willing to overrule constitu-
tional precedents than it is to overrule other kinds of precedent. The usual cite is Burnett v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See generally 
Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REv. I (1979). 
55. The American people often dislike Court decisions that protect obnoxious or de-
spised members of society, but the people respect appeals to their conscience or idealism. 
Americans comply even if complainingly, with the decisions against the constitutionality 
of legislation that can be explained by the Court to violate the Bill of Rights . . . . The 
people seem to regard the Court as their conscience . . . . 
Levy, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An Introduction, in JuDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 41-42 {L. Levy ed. 1967). 
56. "From an early time appointments to the Supreme Court, as compared with those to a 
lower bench, have been made with prime reference to the policy views of prospective nominees as 
well as to their supposed representation of sections and interests." Hurst, supra note 14, at 141. 
The real question, of course, is not that of blind or malicious majorities striking down 
constitutional barriers, but of differing interpretations of the meaning of the Constitu-
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the choice of a new Justice, albeit for only one case. 57 Neither permitting the 
Chief Justice to designate nor resorting to a random selection process is a full 
substitute for a current political check.ss 
A further problem is that unless a designated judge were to sit to hear all 
kindred issues for a period of time, his appointment might well lead to incon-
sistency in the law.59 Perhaps it is for these reasons that we are not aware of 
any legislative proposal to permit assignment of lower court judges to the 
Supreme Court in cases in which the Court splits or a quorum fails.60 
On the other hand, the prudential problems of designation can be over-
stated. Many Supreme Court opinions do not tum on legal issues of great 
national importance, but tum rather on questions of law application or law 
making for which it might be said that it is more important that the question 
be settled than that it be settled right.61 Hence, it might be desirable to estab-
lish a designation system, perhaps limited to cases which do not raise constitu-
tional issues.62 
tion. The crucial question is not so much whether an act does or does not conform to the 
Constitution (for everyone agrees that it should), but who shall judge as to conformity. 
Co=ager, Judicial Review and Democracy, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT, 
supra note 55, at 66 (emphasis added). The paradox of a counter-majoritarian institution in a 
majoritarian society has engaged many scholars. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH (1974). The most basic question asks from what perspective the antimajoritarian docu-
ment is to be interpreted and applied. See Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 
HAR.v. L. REv. 5 (1978). Judicial and scholarly disagreement on what, if any, is the "correct" 
perspective, has been widespread. As a result, the political checks that occur at the time of ap-
pointment, when the Senate can inquire into a nominee's jurisprudence, assume critical 
importance. 
57. Although not the same as a permanent appointment to the Court, becoming Justice by 
designation does resemble a lifetime appointment because, for the particular case, the designee 
will have his vote counted as that of a Supreme Court Justice with all the usual national policy 
implications created by any precedent. 
58. Appointments to the inferior federal courts are rarely subject to piercing senatorial and 
presidential scrutiny of the kind accorded those named to serve on the High Court. It is very 
doubtful that the possibility of assignment to the Supreme Court would enhance the scrutiny. 
Designation by the Chief Justice suffers from the additional drawback of granting too much 
power to one individual. Congress has on at least one recent occasion allowed the Chief Justice of 
the United States to select the lower court judges who will decide politically sensitive cases. In 
1978 Congress created two special courts. The first, comprising seven judges, has jurisdiction to 
consider applications for orders approving wiretaps in national security cases. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) 
(Supp. V 1981). The second court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the first court denying 
approval of a wiretap. Id at§ 1803(b). The judges of those courts are selected from the United 
States district courts and courts of appeals by the Chief Justice and designated by him to the new 
courts for terms of one to seven years, depending on the circumstances. Id at§ 1803 (d). 
59. The observation is buttressed by the uncertain reception occasionally accorded 4-3 
Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 108 Ariz. 508, 502 P.2d 
1327 (1972) (en bane) (refusing to follow a 4-3 decision), criticized in 86 HARV. L. REV. 1307 
(1973). 
60. Had there been proposals to permit designation of a lower federal court judge to the 
Supreme Court, they might well have been discussed in the debate over the proposals for a Na-
tional Court of Appeals as raising analogous problems. See, e.g., Gressman, supra note 52. 
61. See Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
62. Whether a case raised a constitutional issue could be determined by examining the ques-
tions presented on petition for certiorari. Note that the affirmance on equal division settles noth-
ing, for it lacks precedential value. Below we propose to accord equal divisions a limited stare 
decisis effect in the lower courts. See infra note Ill and accompanying text. 
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It is, however, precisely in those compelling cases, when the benefits of 
Supreme Court resolution are greatest, that the costs of designation are great-
est too. Think of the uproar, for example, if Brown v. Board of Education 63 
had been decided by a bare majority, with the swing vote cast by a designated 
judge. On balance, therefore, the practice of designation, like rehearing, ex-
acts too great a price to be an attractive solution to the equal division 
problem.64 
V. TREATING UNAVOIDABLE EQUAL DIVISIONS 
The preceding section suggests that it may be very difficult to find an 
acceptable method for avoiding equal divisions. If so, how should the 
Supreme Court treat those equal divisions that cannot be avoided? This sec-
tion takes a critical look at the tenets of equal division doctrine. 
A. The Rule of Affirmance on Equal Division 
1. Three Options and an Explanation 
The rule that an equal division affirms the decision of the court below was 
the first part of equal division doctrine to be settled. The wisdom of that rule 
cannot be evaluated without considering the options available to the Supreme 
Court when it is deadlocked. In the abstract, there are three possibilities: to 
refuse jurisdiction, to affirm, or to reverse. 
In part two below we propose that, on equal division of the Justices, the 
Supreme Court occasionally should reverse the decision appealed from. In 
what follows immediately we set aside that novel proposal and ask why, once 
the Supreme Court has decided that an equal division should leave the lower 
court's decision undisturbed, it chose to do so by affirming that decision rather 
than by dismissing the appeal. 
Under the prevailing view, the Court is seen as unable to take action on 
equal division. Because an equal division is accorded no stare decisis effect, 
the thrust of the current doctrine is that the Supreme Court has not acted; 
therefore, the decision below is undisturbed. Under these circumstances one 
would expect initially that the Court would simply relinquish jurisdiction on 
equal division rather than follow the present practice of affirming. Justice 
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court in Brown found that segregated public schools violate the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because "[s]eparate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal." Id at 495. 
64. An alternative not considered in the text would be for the Justices to agree to a process 
that would select a Justice who would bow out of the case, leaving an odd number of participating 
Justices. This proposal raises issues of principle including those of consistency identical to those 
involved in designation. See supra text accompanying note 59. Of course, as long as the Justices 
agree to such a process, the constitutional problems involved in designation are avoided. Were 
Congress to specify a process for involuntary recusal, serious issues involving the Justice's consti-
tutionally guaranteed life tenure and general prohibitions on congressional court-tampering 
would be raised. Cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (suggesting the federal 
courts will occasionally find and enforce limits on congressional tampering with judicial 
operations). 
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Field, in his opinion in .Durant, took precisely the view that an equal division 
appeal warrants in effect the dismissal of the appeal: 
In cases of appeal or writ of error in this court, the appellant or plain-
tiffin error is always the moving party. It is affirmative action which 
he asks. The question presented is, shall the judgment, or decree, be 
reversed? If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for 
no order can be made. The judgment of the court below, therefore, 
stands in full force. It is, indeed, the settled practice in such case to 
enter a judgment of qffirmance; but this is only the most convenient 
mode of expressing the fact that the cause is finally disposed of in con-
formity with the action of the court below, and that the court can pro-
ceed to enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if tl1e 
appeal or writ of error, were dismissed. 65 
Surely, if dismissal of the appeal were a possibility open to the Court, it would 
be, as Field recognized, the most forthright judgment. Why, then, did the 
Supreme Court develop and adhere to the practice of affirmance? 
There are two likely reasons. The first is that the English practice was to 
affirm in the event of a deadlock that could not be broken.66 Perhaps of more 
importance, until the great transformation of the Supreme Court's appellate 
jurisdiction occurred between 1891 and 1925, that jurisdiction was predomi-
nantly mandatory.67 Thus, in most cases the Court had to enter an order on 
the merits. After 1925, when the Judges Bill68 completed the metamorphasis, 
discretionary review became the dominant form.69 These changes rendered it 
possible for the Court to consider large parts of its jurisdiction truly discretion-
ary, and the practice of dismissing a petition for certiorari on equal division 
might well have developed.70 This would have involved some stretching of 
the doctrine of improvident grants of certiorari;71 and, more importantly, a 
dismissal practice would have led to disparity with appeals, in which the exer-
cise of jurisdiction is mandatory. Although the Court has stretched the judi-
cially discovered nonsubstantiability exception to its "mandatory" appellate 
jurisdiction to such lengths that mandatory jurisdiction has begun to appear to 
be discretionary, that development has been subject to embarrassingly sharp 
criticism.72 The Court would well warrant the scathing attack it would incur if 
65. · Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 112 (1868) (emphasis added). 
66. Justice Field noted that although English practice attempted to avoid equal divisions, id. 
at 111, unavoidable equal divisions resulted in affirmance, id. at 112-13. See the discussion of 
Catherwood v. Caslon, 153 Eng. Rep. 108 (1844) supra note 26, at 57. 
67. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 35-37, 40-41 (1953) [hereinafter cited as HART & 
WECHSLER). 
68. H.R. 8206, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 CoNG. REc. 2928 (1925). 
69. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 41. 
70. The petition would have been dismissed as having been granted improvidently. 
71. For a discussion of the doctrine, seeR. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 38, at 369-74. 
The data, however, do not indicate that the Court is dealing with equal divisions by dismissing the 
petition for certiorari in that way: eleven of the last twelve equal divisions, for example, have 
mvolved certiorari cases. 
72. See Justice Clark's statement that during his eighteen years as a Supreme Court Justice 
"appeals from state decisions received treatment similar to that accorded petitions for cer-
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it defined substantiability of a federal question in terms of the Court's ability 
to find a majority. As a result, dismissal of appeals in equal division cases is 
neither politically possible nor doctrinally justifiable. 
To the extent the Court continues formally to sustain the decisions below 
when it has divided evenly, the Court might consider treating certiorari cases 
differently and dismissing the writ as granted improvidently. Surely the no-
tion that a grant once provident has become improvident neither stretches lan-
guage nor the policy behind the improvidence rule. This solution is not 
satisfactory, however, because the Court cannot change its practice on appeal 
under the current statutory law; because the Court might reasonably wish to 
treat substantively identical certiorari and appeals practices as formally identi-
cal; and finally, because little is at stake except accurate labeling. 
2. Deeply Embedded Assumptions Supporting the Rule of Affirmance 
The preceding analysis explains why the Court, desiring to let the judg-
ment below stand, employed the rule of affirmance rather than dismissal. That 
analysis, however, does not address the more fundamental question of why the 
Court has without exception chosen to affirm rather than reverse when an 
equal division occurs. Although today we are so conditioned to the rule of 
affirmance that it seems to be the only possible choice, there are cases in which 
a rule of reversal would be preferable. The apparent inevitability of the rule of 
affirmance stems from a particular view of the significance of an equal divi-
sion. Justice Field's opinion for the Court in Durant makes clear the nature of 
this view: 
It has long been the doctrine in this country and in England, where 
courts consist of several members, that no affirmative action can be 
had in a cause where the judges are equally divided in opinion as to the 
judgment to be rendered or order to be made. If affirmative action is 
necessary for the further progress of the cause, the division operates 
as a stay of proceedings. If the affirmative action sought is to set aside 
or modify an existing judgment or order, the division operates as a 
denial of the application, and the judgment, or order, stands in full 
force, to be carried into effect by the ordinary means. 
In cases of appeal or writ of error in this court, the appellant or 
plaintiff in error is always the moving party. It is affirmative action 
which he asks. The question presented is, shall the judgment, or de-
cree, be reversed? If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, 
for no order can be made .73 
In Field's view a majority is necessary for the Court to act; hence, when the 
Court evenly divides it takes no action. Because Field viewed the order of 
affirmance as the equivalent of the dismissal of the appeal, the decision ap-
tiorari .... " Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833, 836 (5th Cir. 1975) (Clark, J., concurring). See 
also Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term: Foreword: The Time Chari if the Justices, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 84, 89 n.l3 {1959). 
73. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at ll0-ll2 (emphasis added). 
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pealed from is left standing. Implicit seems to be the proposition that the 
Supreme Court either cannot or will not accord to its equal division a signifi-
cance other than "no affirmative action."74 
The rule of affirmance for equal divisions in appellate cases follows logi-
cally from the rule of "no affirmative action." But surface logic in law is not 
invincible and must retreat before contrary precedent or other logic based on 
better policy. Thus, it must be asked whether the no affirmative action rule is 
supported by sound policy and by case law. 
There is some support, ironically, from Field's own pen in .Duran/, for a 
more fluid analysis in original jurisdiction cases. After setting forth the no 
affirmative action view for appellate cases, he contrasted the effect of equal 
division in original cases. He concluded that the significance of an equal divi-
sion-negative or affirmative-is itself a question that must be resolved by the 
Court according to sound policy: 
[I]n the case of the demurrer, the Fjfecl of a division would depend, we 
think, upon the rules of practice established in such cases., for in the 
absence of a settled practice or general rule of court upon the subject, 
the judges disagreeing as to the demurrer might disagree also as to 
the effect of their inability to decide it, as was the fact in this court in 
the case between the Commonwealth of Virginia and West Virginia, 
argued upon demurrer to the bill at the last term.7S 
Field thus recognized that in an original jurisdiction case, by majority rule, the 
Court may choose a rule defining the significance of the failure to muster a 
majority. 
Virginia v. West Virginia, 76 the case referred to by Field, was an equal 
division in conference only; ultimately, a majority decided the case. Field's 
statements are simply passing commentary about the views of some Justices on 
how equal divisions on certain trial issues ought to be resolved. In the middle 
of this century, however, in In re .Disbarment of Isserman, 77 the Court at least 
partially exposed its view of its own latitude in choosing to accord affirmative 
significance to equal division in original cases. 
Before 1954, the Supreme Court's rules provided that, upon being dis-
barred in a state proceeding, a member of the bar of the United States 
74. A special rule on precedent in equal divisions is necessary because, according to some 
views of what constitutes precedent, it is the bare decision, coupled with the facts, that provides the 
ratio decidendi. See, e.g., Goodhart, On Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L. J. 
I6I (I930). This view is generally associated with English courts and does not comport with 
current American views. 
75. /Juran!, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 112 (emphasis added). The no affirmative action doctrine 
has been used in other courts to resolve a question when there was no decision below. E.g., State 
ex rel Att'y Gen'l v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 64I, 672, I49 So. 409, 420 (1933) (demurrer to 
original action overruled when court split evenly; a majority is necessary to sustain a demurrer). 
q: Henry v. Ricketts, II F. Cas. II88 (C.D.D.C. I809), discussed supra note 20. One court noted 
that it was the "universal rule" that upon equal division, "the subject matter with which it [the 
tribunal] is dealing must remain the status quo." In re First Cong. Dist. Election, 295 Pa. I, I2, 
144 A. 735, 739 (1928). 
76. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 39 (I870). 
77. 345 U.S. 286 (1953), vacated on reh'g, 348 U.S. 1 (1954). 
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Supreme Court would be suspended and required to show cause why he 
should not be removed from the list of those admitted to that bar.78 lsserman 
was suspended under that rule.79 After Justice Clark recused himself 80 in the 
show cause proceeding, the Supreme Court split four to four. Because Is-
serman had not shown cause, that is, because he had not rebutted the prevail-
ing presumption, he was disbarred.81 The Court, in other words, by its own 
rule chose to allow state disbarment to raise a federal presumption against 
members of its own bar; the state order did not operate by its own force to 
disbar Isserman. Thus, according to the Court's interpretation of its own rules 
in Isserman, the presumption disposed of an equal division. 
Shortly after the original disposition of Isserman, the Supreme Court 
amended its rules to require that a majority decide that cause had not been 
shown before an attorney would be disbarred.82 Not long afterwards, the 
Supreme Court granted Isserman a rehearing. As a result of a change in the 
Court's personnel, the vote this time was four to three in Isserman's favor. 83 
Isserman holds interest for two reasons. First, its initial disposition dem-
onstrates that the Court can and has chosen to accord affirmative significance 
to an equal division. On equal division, Isserman was disbarred. Although the 
Court later changed its rule to accord no affirmative action to equal division in 
disbarment cases, there is no indication that it did so because of a view that 
"no affirmative action" is the universally proper result on equal division. In-
deed, the dissenters in the first Isserman case did not complain about the dis-
barment on equal division rule. Their remarks dealt with their reasons for 
voting not to disbar; they did not deal with the correctness of the result given 
the votes that occurred.84 If according affirmative action to equal division had 
been seen by the dissenters as universally and fundamentally wrong, it is likely 
they would have said so. Although we have no record of the Court's delibera-
tions in changing its rule, it seems likely that change resulted from a policy 
analysis in the specific context of a disbarment. The Court may well have 
concluded that something resembling a presumption of leniency ought to de-
cide an equal division in such contexts in which the potential loss is great. 
Isserman not only demonstrates that the Court can choose to accord af-
firmative action to an equal division; it makes clear how the Court can make 
such a choice. This is the second lesson of Isserman. Because in the original 
jurisdiction cases the important policy of supporting a lower court's judgment 
is not implicated, it is much easier to see the wealth of other policies that bear 
on a principled choice of rules for dealing with equal division. Under the 
78. Sup. Ct. R. 2(5), 345 U.S. 286 (1953). 
79. lsserman, 345 U.S. at 287. 
80. ld at 290. 
81. ld at 286, 290. 
82. This became rule 8, later deleted in the 1980 revision of the Supreme Court's rules, ap-
parently because the problem occurs so infrequently as not to deserve a special rule. Bennett & 
Gressman, 17ze Supreme Court's New Rules for the Eighties, 85 F.R.D. 487, 515, n.22. (1980). 
83. In re Disbarment of Isserman, 348 U.S. 1 (1954). 
84. /sserman, 345 U.S. at 290-94 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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original Isserman rule, for example, the dispositive policy was the efficiency of 
giving presumptive effect to highly relevant and probably accurate state 
proceedings. 
Although Isserman and the statements by Justice Field are concerned 
with questions arising on original jurisdiction, both have implications for the 
equal division in appellate cases. Both suggest an alternative to the current 
practice of rote affirmance. The desirability of an alternative should not be 
surprising; the no affirmative action doctrine derives from procedural rules 
designed to deal with problems different from those presented by an equal 
division. The no affirmative action doctrine analogizes an appellant's burden 
of convincing on legal issues to a plaintiff's burden of persuasion on most is-
sues of fact. The usual burden of proof rules were designed to deal with the 
allocation of the burden of proving facts, a problem quite different from the 
proper allocation of the burden of convincing on a legal issue. Once that dif-
ference is recognized, the need to inquire de novo into the equal division prob-
lem, rather than to follow blindly a rule designed for other situations, should 
also be recognized. 
This inquiry can move from the abstract to the concrete with an example 
inspired by Justice Field's demurrer case. Suppose, in an original jurisdiction 
case, the Justices divide four to four on the legal sufficiency of a defense that is 
supported by stipulated facts. Should the result depend upon who would have 
had to establish the facts underlying the defense-should the defense fail, in 
other words, because by analogy to the usual rules of burden of proof, the 
defendant has the burden on that matter? Should it depend upon who had the 
burden of going forward or upon who had the burden of persuasion, assuming 
the two to be different? Should rules designed to allocate the responsibility for 
initiating a factual inquiry or for persuading on the facts-presumably fash-
ioned to provide economy based upon considerations of motivation, warning 
and access to facts-have anything to do with who ought to prevail on even 
divisions over a question of law? In such cases the issue has been raised, ar-
gued, and considered by the Court, and the policies that dictate the shape of 
the burden of proof system simply have no force.85 
Sound policy, at least in the form of economy of application, may well 
support the affirmance rule in the garden variety even division. Once freed of 
the view that affirmance on equal division is inevitable, courts and commenta-
tors can inquire into the desirability of a different rule for cases in which poli-
cies supporting reversal may outweigh those supporting affirmance. Examined 
below are some candidates for another rule, including cases in which the lower 
court has struck down a federal statute and cases in which the court below 
affirmed a criminal conviction. Sound decisionmaking by the Court requires 
an inquiry into alternative solutions that properly recognize competing 
85. The allocation of the burden of proof, of course, can be made to achieve substantive 
goals. Such allocations differ markedly from the current equal division allocation because the 
latter does not seek to serve any well identified and carefully considered goals. 
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considerations. 86 
Any inquiry into alternative solutions must address two concerns. First, 
the solution should tum on policy, on analysis of the institutional and juris-
prudential concerns that a particular problem implicates. Second, the solution 
must be practical. The rule of affirmance does have the advantage of extreme 
ease of application. Any substitute must be subject to at least some form of 
cost-benefit analysis. Those two concerns are addressed in the following 
section. 
B. Policy Analysis in Equal Division Cases 
1. The Search for Guidance 
Inquiry into alternatives to the rule of affirmance must not be conducted 
in a vacuum. A procedure familiar to students of interest analysis in conflicts 
cases87 can be employed to provide a principled basis for Supreme Court ac-
tion in the event of an equal division. The inquiry should be directed at those 
policies and principles, both institutional and jurisprudential, that can be rec-
ognized as authoritative elsewhere in our legal system and that can be used to 
legitimate judicial action when, as in the equal division situation, more tradi-
tionallegal analysis fails. The search, in other words, should be for solutions 
that reflect policy analysis, policies derived from basic institutional 
considerations. 
An equal division by the Supreme Court is a statement from the highest 
level of our judicial system that the issues are close, balanced on a knife's edge. 
This statement, not that made by the court below, is the last definitive state-
ment of the federal judicial system. Still, the case does not remain balanced 
on the knife because even a nondecision (such as relinquishing jurisdiction) is, 
in fact, a decision in favor of the result reached below. 88 It is necessary, there-
fore, to examine whether any policies support across the board application of 
the present rule of affirmance. 
86. The declaratory judgment proceeding provides another example of the problem discussed 
in the text. If in a nisi prius case a multi-judge court splits evenly on an issue necessary to the 
grant of a declaratory judgment, how should an appellate court proceed? To refuse a declaration 
in favor of the party seeking declaration of a legal right leads to the difficulty that the other party 
could have sought a declaration of no right. Should the same issue be resolved differently depend-
ing on which party seeks the declaration? Perhaps the best way of dealing with the matter is to 
treat the refusal to grant a declaratory judgment in such cases as a non-declaration containing no 
determination of substance. That variation from usual practice would reflect a principled depar-
ture from usual declaratory judgment practice-a departure made to deal with the peculiar prob-
lem of even division. 
87. The analogy between the equal division problem and developments in the theory of con-
flicts of law is striking. For much of this century the territorial theory of the RESTATEMENT OF 
CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1933) held the nation's courts in thrall. That theory, like the rule of affirm-
ance, imposed a flat rule of decision (e.g., lex loci delecti) in each case without regard to the 
policies represented by the competing laws. Conflicts law today, however, generally inquires into 
those policies and considers how best to accommodate competing policies. Similarly, we propose 
inquiry into institutional and jurisprudential policies that might, in some instances, replace the 
rigid rule of affirmance. 
88. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 534-37 (lOth ed. 1958). 
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It is tempting to assume that support of the judgment in the lower court is 
gro:unded in the policy of attempting to reach a correct decision on the facts 
and substantive law. It is also tempting to view decisions of the lower courts 
as being "right" more often than not. The equal division in the Supreme 
Court itself, however, demonstrates that, from a realistic point of view, the 
probability of "correctness" is imaginary. Beyond that, the lower court may 
have taken a position contrary to the majority of other lower courts. The 
lower court, for example, may be the only one of a number of courts of ap-
peals to have decided a question in a particular way. If any position is likely 
to be "correct," it is that of the majority of circuits, yet we would not assume 
that the Supreme Court, on equal division, should impose the majority rule on 
the minority circuit. Thus, a desire to achieve a "correct" solution cannot sup-
port the rule of affirmance on equal division. 
As a consequence, it is plain that if the rule of affirmance is anything 
more than a bright-line solution employed in the absence of strong counter-
vailing policies, it is based only on the policy of enhancing the dignity of the 
lower federal courts and permitting the circuits and the states to operate as 
jurisprudential laboratories. Even assuming that the rule of affirmance is sup-
ported by those policies and, therefore, is more than a bright-line rule 
designed to fill a policy vacuum, those are frail policies indeed to withstand 
the stern competition offered by policies implicated in certain classes of cases. 
Equal divisions in those cases raise fundamental questions concerning the al-
location of power in our federal system. 
2. Competing Policies 
a. The Presumption of Constitutionality. The presumption of constitu-
tionality has many sources. Perhaps the most obvious is the notion that legis-
lators, like judges, take a prescribed oath to uphold the Constitution; a statute 
represents, therefore, the considered judgment of a co-equal branch that a 
course of action satisfies the requirements of organic law.89 The presumption 
also stems from the ability of a legislature to develop and evaluate facts in a 
way different from, and, in some respects, superior to that of a court; the legis-
lature, therefore, is better able to appreciate the circumstances that led to a 
particular choice. Moreover, legislation may require an accommodation of 
competing constitutional provisions;90 again, the choice made by the legisla-
ture should be entitled to great deference.91 
Overriding all of these reasons, however, is the recognition by many 
89. On the duty of Congress to consider the Constitution, see P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CoN-
STlTUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 44-46 (1975) . .But see Mikva, How Well JJoes Congress Support 
and JJefend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REv. 587 (1983). 
90. A statute forbidding certain forms of private racial discrimination, for example, may 
hamper freedom of association. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). A law requiring 
an owner to permit certain speech in his shopping center may limit the owner's property rights. 
Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
91. For an examination of various occasions for judicial deference, seeP. BREST, supra note 
89, at 979-86, 1004-10. 
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judges and scholars that judicial review is inherently antidemocratic and that 
the will of the people should not be overborne unless that will can be authori-
tatively found to conflict with fundamentallaw.92 This view of James Brad-
ley Thayer93 and his latter day followers94 does not confine the operation of 
the presumption of constitutionality to cases turning on questions of fact. The 
soundness of their view is questionable to the extent it asserts that individual 
Justices should defer to Congress on pure judgments of constitutional law, as 
opposed to judgments of constitutional legislative fact.95 The requirement 
that an individual Justice presume strongly but not conclusively in favor of 
another institution's reading of the Constitution is difficult to comprehend. 
The problems of prescribing the presumption for decisions of individual Jus-
tices simply do not exist at the institutional level, however. When the institu-
tion is deadlocked after the individual Justices have voted according to their 
own views of judicial review and the substantive constitutional question in-
volved, the notion of a presumption favoring constitutionality is workable and 
desirable. Underlying it is the simple assumption that when the highest 
counter-majoritarian institution is of two minds on whether a measure violates 
minority rights under our social contract, the presumption should favor the 
outcome of the majoritarian process.96 
Although this Article does not undertake a full critical analysis of the use 
made of the presumption of constitutionality in general, the presumption 
seems particularly appropriate as a force in Supreme Court equal division 
cases. Using the presumption to break the deadlock better reflects the republi-
can nature of our government than does either the designation device or the 
current practice of affirming. Using the presumption, however, would raise a 
number of important questions: Would it matter what sort of governmental 
92. Professor Choper has suggested that more deference should be accorded congressional 
action in some contexts-e.g., federal legislation impinging on state sovereignty-than in others-
e.g., a dispute between the President and Congress. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NA-
TIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT (1980). C.f. Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret .Due Process and Equal Protection, 21 
STAN. L. REv. 603, 613-14 (1975) (suggesting that Congress has more "institutional competence" 
and, hence, is better able to legislate under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment in areas in which 
state and national interests conflict than in the arena of civil liberties). 
93. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American .Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REv. 129 (1893). Thayer found in the decisions of the state and federal courts a rule requiring a 
clear showing of unconstitutionality as a prerequisite to judicial invalidation. Id. at 140-43. 
Thayer endorsed this rule. I d. at 143-53, 155-56. See also Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitu-
tion: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209, 
230-31 (1983). 
94. For expressions of agreement with Thayer, see S. GABIN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
REASONABLE DOUBT TEST 27-46 {1980); Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. 
REv. 1002, 1003-04 (1924). 
95. See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 192-222 {1960). 
96. West German law provides that, in the case of a tie vote in the Constitutional Court, a 
violation of the constitution or other federal law cannot be found. Federal Republic of Germany, 
Law Concerning the Federal Constitutional Court § 15, P. 2, Sen. 4. 
Occasional efforts have been made in Congress to require that decisions invalidating a statute 
have the concurrence of a majority, or even more than a majority, of the Supreme Court. See, 
e.g., S. KUTLER, supra note 35, at 35, 45-46, 74-77. A congressionally-imposed rule of decision 
raises serious constitutional problems. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
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action the lower court struck down? Which, if any, of the presumptions of 
constitutionality is such a force? Under what circumstances should that 
happen? 
i Federal Statutes. The presumption of constitutionality is at its strong-
est in the case of federal statutes, because the statute was produced by the 
federal majoritarian process. In addition, the executive (the third branch of 
government) has concurred (or had its veto overridden by a super-majority). 
A case in which a lower court held a federal statute unconstitutional wot:ld be, 
therefore, the best candidate for the application of an institutional presump-
tion of constitutionality to reverse the decision of a lower court. 
Common Cause v. Schmitt97 provides a dramatic example. The district 
court in that case held unconstitutional the federal statutory prohibition on 
individual campaign contributions greater than $1000. The Supreme Court, 
evenly divided, affirmed. The decision below has effectively eliminated a very 
important component of the federal regulation of elections, a component sup-
ported by both Congress and the President. The even split in the Supreme 
Court makes clear that the argument for constitutionality of the Act is as close 
to success as is the opposing argument. In that situation, the argument for 
deferring to the considered views of the Court's coordinate branches-until a 
majority of the Supreme Court disagrees-is strong.9s 
ii Federal Executive and Administrative Action. The presumption of 
constitutionality is sufficiently forceful to warrant its use when the equal divi-
sion involves action taken by or done under the direct authorization of the 
President of the United States, especially when that action is consistent with 
legislative directions in that area. Other executive and administrative action, 
however, is too loosely connected to the majoritarian process and too far re-
moved from the work of a coordinate branch of government to warrant a pre-
sumption having as much force as that in favor of a lower federal court's 
decision.99 Further, any attempt to differentiate among agency actions based 
on the closeness of that action to the political process is bound to prove very 
difficult. The Supreme Court, however, may be able to work out a useful set 
of presumptions for this area on a case by case basis. Although this Article 
does not suggest such a set, the Court should bear this possibility in mind 
when reviewing decisions in the administrative law field. 
iii Actions by States. The difficulty in cases in which the Supreme Court 
97. 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980) (three-judge court), ajf'd by an equally divided court, 455 
u.s. 129 (1982). 
98. Support for the need to have a majority of the Court resolve a constitutional issue comes 
from no less an authority than John Marshall. When illness prevented Justices Duvall and John-
son from sitting, with the remainder of the Court apparently divided, Marshall put two cases over 
until the next Term "under the expectation that a larger number of the judges may then be pres-
ent." Briscoe v. Co=onwealth's Bank, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118, 122 (1834). Marshall noted that "the 
practice of this court is, not (except in cases of absolute necessity) to deliver any judgment in cases 
where constitutional questions are involved, unless four judges concur in opinion thus making lite 
decision that of a majority of the whole court." /d. (emphasis added). 
99. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 89-90 (1969), 
for a discussion of the inadvisability of deferring to a constitutional decision made by "Police 
Chief Doe." 
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divides evenly on the constitutional validity of an action by a state is that 
resolution by a majoritarian presumption, which should occur with federal 
statutes, simply will not work. Half the Justices believe that supreme federal 
law-itself the product of a majoritarian process-forbids the state action in 
question. The other half believes that the supreme federal law permits the 
choice state government made. 
Thus, the case is balanced on a knife's edge; a simple intrasystemic 
majoritarian presumption cannot be used to break the deadlock because the 
conflict is an intersystemic one, a problem of federalism. The Constitution 
provides no clear presumption for dealing with doubtful cases of federal limits 
on state authority. An ardent federalist might argue that a dispositive pre-
sumption should be recognized in favor of the product of the broadest 
majoritarian process, that is, a constitutional limitation or other federal law. 
Certainly when the state law arguably interferes with the operation of the fed-
eral government this view has some force. 100 An ardent defender of states' 
rights could argue, on the other hand, that the federal government is one of 
limited powers and that close questions should be decided in favor of state 
power. 
Although there is considerable sentiment that, in general, in close cases 
the courts should not invalidate an act of Congress, there does not appear to 
be a clear consensus on how such states' rights issues should be resolved. 
Under such circumstances when other policies, like equally opposed vectors, 
cancel, the policies favoring affirmance of the decision should be used to dis-
pose of the case. 
b. Policy Considerations: The Presumption Favoring Criminal .Defend-
ants. Considerations other than institutional ones may be employed to avoid 
an equal division. If our system oflaw has a built-in tilt in favor of the consti-
tutionality of certain acts of government, it also has a clear tilt favoring crimi-
nal defendants. The familiar presumptions of fact in favor of a criminal 
defendant, 101 together with the principle of strict construction of criminal stat-
utes, 102 demonstrate this bias. Our system of criminal justice evidences a great 
concern that persons not be convicted of crimes unless clear law as applied to 
100. Justice Taney once took the position that the Supreme Court in its capacity of umpire of 
the constitutional validity of state acts, is more like an entity separate from both the state and 
federal governments than it is like a third branch of the federal system. Gordon v. United States, 
117 U.S. 697, 699-701 (1864) (published in 1886). If one agrees that the great but not perfect 
independence of federal judges leads to their neutral application of the Constitution in state-
federal disputes, then concern over the nondemocratic nature of judicial review of state statutes is 
lessened. Taney's premise lends some weight to an argument against application of an appellate 
court presumption of constitutionality in favor of state action. On this view there is a low 
probability of lower court bias. 
101. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (describing both co=on law practice 
and the constitutional rules requiring proof of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt). 
102. For examples of the federal judicial policy of construing criminal statutes in favor of 
leniency, see Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 
808, 812 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). For examples of strict construction 
against the government in state criminal proceedings, see People v. Lutz, 73 Ill. 2d 204, 212-13, 
383 N.E.2d 171, 174 (1978); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 631, 470 P.2d 617, 624, 87 
Cal. Rptr. 481, 488 (1970). 
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clear fact so warrants.103 That concern placed in the context of an equal divi-
sion argues forcefully that a conviction should not be sustained unless affirmed 
by a majority of the highest court to hear the case.104 
c. Co'!flicts of Presumptions. We earlier recognized and endorsed some 
limited presumptions of invalidity of lower court decisions and a concomitant 
rule of reversal. In some cases those presumptions may clash with one an-
other. Suppose a lower court has upheld state action that conflicts with a fed-
eral statute, the holding below being that the federal statute is 
unconstitutional. If the Supreme Court should divide evenly in such a case the 
Court should follow the usual affirmance rule, but for equal divisions involv-
ing federal statutes generally, the Court should employ a presumption of va-
lidity, and reverse the decision invalidating an act of Congress. Any 
inconsistency between these two situations is more apparent than real. The 
analysis of the state action problem suggests that when federal law of any sort, 
constitutional or statutory, places a doubtful limit on state action, there is no 
constitutional textual indication of, and no clear consensus upon which to 
build, an appropriate presumption. Hence, for cases involving state legislation 
challenged on grounds of inconsistency with a federal statute, challenged in 
tum on grounds of encroaching on state power, the absence of a presumption 
justifies the affirmance rule. 
More difficult are cases in which the presumption in favor of criminal 
defendants clashes with the presumption favoring the constitutionality of fed-
erallegislation. What should be done when the Court divides on the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute challenged on constitutional grounds by a 
criminal defendant? One of the authors believes that the presumption in favor 
of the majoritarian process is so central as to outweigh the more amorphous 
policies favoring criminal defendants. The latter are drawn from constitu-
tional provisions and canons of interpretation not directly applicable to the 
problem of equal division. When the case is on a knife's edge, should the 
general concern of the law for individuals outweigh the will of a majoritarian 
process that presumably considered the interests of such individuals in ap-
103. It is the policy of this state to construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendant 
as its language and the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit; just as in 
the case of a question of fact, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable 
doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a 
statute .... 
Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 631,470 P.2d 624, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481,488 (1970) (citations 
omitted). 
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old 
than [statutory] construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights 
of individuals; and on the plain principle, that the power of punishment is vested in the 
legislative, not the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to 
define a crime, and ordain its punishment. 
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1870) (emphasis added). Note it is not 
simply a desire to keep the Court within its sphere that Marshall saw as the object of strict con-
strucuon. Were that the only reason, no distinction would be drawn between canons of construc-
tion in criminal and civil cases. It is only the "tenderness" of the law for the rights of individuals 
that justifies a particularly one-sided strict construction doctrine in criminal cases. 
104. See Note, supra note 5, at 586-88. 
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proving legislation? It is important to remember that in such a case no major-
ity of the Court has found a violation of a provision of the Bill of Rights. The 
other author believes, however, that the perception of unfairness in that situa-
tion, and the general strength of the policy favoring criminal defendants, 
should lead to a reversal of the conviction. lOs 
3. Need for Issue-by-Issue Analysis 
The analysis, in the cases described above, of how the Supreme Court 
should evaluate competing principles and policies is designed to illustrate the 
method of searching for institutional and jurisprudential concepts embedded 
in our law that will help it resolve equal divisions on a principled basis. Far 
more important than the analysis of particular categories of cases is the gen-
eral conclusion that the Court should be aware of the possibility of identifying 
policies that by broad consensus of the Justices could be used to dispose of 
equal divisions in principled ways. 106 
This Article has not attempted to delineate all the possible presumptions, 
but suggests that the Court consider carefully their use in cases of even divi-
sion. That raises the question of the procedure the Court should use in em-
ploying the presumption. In some cases, at least, it could be done by court 
rule.107 Rules would be most useful in situations in which the desirability and 
effect of the presumption is clear, as it is in the cases of criminal conviction on 
a federal statute held unconstitutional below. Rulemaking, of course, in-
creases predictability and consistency; and it has the further advantage of 
eliminating the possibility of an even split on whether to adopt the presump-
tion. In other situations the presumption may be less clear and rulemaking, 
therefore, less appropriate, as in most cases reviewing administrative action. 
Consider a case before the Supreme Court on its original jurisdiction docket. 
In that situation there is no decision of a lower court. What should be the 
result if the Justices split evenly on the issue whether the Court has subject 
matter jurisdiction? One presumption that might be used construes federal 
court jurisdiction narrowly; thus, the case might be dismissed. More generally, 
however, one of the Court's roles is that ofumpire of the federal system. That 
consideration argues forcefully for assumption of jurisdiction in a case such as 
the hypothetical. 
Whatever the outcome, the interplay of presumptions in some situations 
could be quite complex, not readily accessible to an a priori rule-imposed solu-
tion. In those cases the Justices may agree that no special principles bear on 
how the tie should be broken; in that event, economy and the general princi-
ples discussed above recommend an affirmance. If the Justices believe strong 
105. The authors, being divided evenly here, cannot make a recommendation on this issue. 
106. The policy analysis for equal divisions can be employed by other appellate courts as well, 
if they should evenly divide. Other alternatives are perhaps more readily accessible to those 
courts; a federal circuit court, for example, could adopt procedures which ensure that an even 
number of judges never hear an en bane proceeding. 
107. An example is the rule which was amended in response to the firstisserman decision. See 
supra text accompanying note 82. 
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policies are implicated, the Court should determine, in good common law 
fashion, how the competing presumptions play out against the backdrop of an 
actual case. 
The only valid reason to affirm routinely on equal division is the economy 
of doing so. The use of presumptions generally would only be slightly less 
efficient. Once identified, the presumption of constitutionality, for example, 
can be applied effortlessly; the only burden on the Court would be that in-
volved in establishing the presumption in the first instance. That would be a 
very small price to pay for the large benefit of according proper respect to the 
actions of another branch of government. The cost of weighing presumptions 
in a case such as the original jurisdiction hypothetical is greater. los Again, 
however, the resulting benefit, accommodating competing concerns funda-
mental to our government of laws, makes the game seem well worth the 
candle. 109 
4. Stare Decisis in Presumption Cases 
The precedential effect of an equal division in the Court must tum on the 
impact of the decision on both the Court itself and on lower courts. An infer-
ior tribunal should feel itself bound at least by the decision of the Supreme 
Court; consistency requires that it be treated as a high Court decision. Thus, if 
the Court splits evenly on the question of the constitutionality of a federal 
statute, no lower court should invalidate the law in the face of a similar 
challenge. 110 
The decision based on an equal division, however, should not be viewed 
as binding the Justices who did not participate. To take a position contrary to 
that established by an equal division should not be viewed as a vote to over-
rule a case. It is important to bear in mind that we are attempting, after all, 
only to determine the best way to deal temporarily with the absence of a defin-
itive decision. 
C. The No Opinion Practice 
There is one simple device that the Court could use to ameliorate much of 
the impact of all equal divisions: In all cases, even ones in which an equal 
108. It might matter, for example, if a lower federal court is avilable to hear the case. If it is 
not, then no effective forum exists for resolving the dispute. The argument for exercising jurisdic-
tion, therefore, would be stronger. 
109. A problem may also be so rare as not to warrant a full rule to deal with it. An example is 
the rule dealing with disbarment in the Supreme Court, deleted in the 1980 revision because of the 
infrequency of the problem it addressed. See supra note 82. 
Our proposal could be extended to require affirmance unless a majority of the Court could 
agree on a single opinion that would explain the result. We do not argue for such an extension, 
however, primarily because of the extreme difficulty in implementing it on a Court that has be-
come accustomed to the practice of each Justice writing separately. 
110. It is also possible that a lower court could extract more from the decisions in later cases. 
The process would resemble that used to decipher the precedential effect of a su=ary affirmance 
or dismissal for want of a substantial federal question. The process may resemble reading the 
entrails of sheep for clues to the secrets of the quark. See generally, W. REYNOLDS, supra note 5, 
at 104-06. 
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division is unavoidable, the Justices should write opinions explaining why 
they voted as they did. In this way some guidance could be given concerning 
the way in which the members of the Court view the problem.111 Thus, each 
faction could write an opinion that might prove instructive to lower courts and 
invite critical commentary from judges and scholars.112 There is no theoreti-
cal objection to that practice;113 indeed it closely resembles the practice of 
issuing opinions in cases decided by a plurality.114 In both situations the only 
reason to do so is to inform; 115 at least in the areas of plurality opinions that 
function has been served (too well, some might say). Nor would it be novel to 
have an exposition of position by members of the equal division; the practice 
has a long history. In Holmes v. Jennison, for example, Chief Justice Taney 
explained that the opinion below would be affirmed by an equal division; but 
"[i]t is, however, deemed advisable in order to prevent mistake or misconstruc-
tion, to state the opinions we have respectively formed." 116 A good thing the 
Court did so, for Holmes is the only explication of the effect of an extradition 
treaty between a state and a foreign nation. 117 
Holmes is by no means unique in its exposition. In recent years, occa-
sionally a Justice has made a statement concerning his view of the case. IIS 
Somewhat more common is what might be styled partial expressions; in these 
cases a majority of the Court agrees on the disposition of part of the case and 
renders an opinion on that issue, leaving the rest of the case to be disposed of 
by the laconic notation, "affirmed by an equally divided court."119 When the 
Court follows this procedure, it at least makes clear some ofthe law implicated 
in the case, a clear benefit. Further, explication of the grounds for an individ-
ual decision serves as the best possible check on the integrity of the Justices' 
decisionmaking. 120 Because failure to do so creates unnecessary speculation 
and confusion, it can at least be argued that the Court fails of its duty when 
the Justices do not set forth their thinking.I21 
Ill. If the Court were to split evenly on the applicable rule of law, but, due to the circum-
stances of the case, all Justices agreed on the outcome, opinions would be written under current 
practice. A recent example is Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez, 102 S. Ct. 
3260 (1982). 
112. This is what happened, of course, in the most famous equal division of all, reported in 
Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). 
113. Although the expression is dictum, so is the statement by different factions in many plu-
rality opinions. 
114. See generally, Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme 
Court, 1974 DUKE L. J. 58. 
115. Even if there is no holding, lower courts and the bar can learn the thinking of the Justices 
on the problem. There are also times when a "holding" can be inferred from common ground to a 
majority of the Court. See id. at 83-85. 
116. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 561 (1840). 
117. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION 231 (1972). 
118. See, e.g., Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 404 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
119. See, e.g., Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 442 (1959). 
120. See Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Cita-
tion Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1203-04 (1978). 
121. See Justice Rehnquist's eloquent explanation of why he did not recuse himself in Laird v. 
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1973). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has been content for over a hundred years to deal 
with the occasional problem presented by a tie vote among the Justices by the 
simple expedient of affirming without opinion, an act carrying no precedential 
weight. That practice has the virtue only of simplicity, failing to address either 
the Justices' obligations to the litigants or to other branches of government. 
This Article, by examining the equal division problem and proposing alterna-
tives to the present system, aims to stimulate thought concerning the larger 
issue of mechanical application of judicial procedures. 
